More on the functional view of cognition : a biofunctional model of mental content, mental structures, awareness, and attention by Iran-Nejad, Asghar
U11
ILLINOI S
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
PRODUCTION NOTE
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign Library
Large-scale Digitization Project, 2007.

T1?( I ~5
Technical Report No. 304
v.....OtAS V.F, i ^gt 6"
MORE ON THE FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF COGNITION:
A BIOFUNCTIONAL MODEL OF MENTAL CONTENT,
MENTAL STRUCTURES, AWARENESS, AND ATTENTION
Asghar Iran-Nejad and Andrew Ortony
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
December 1983
Center for the Study of Reading
READING
EDUCATION
REPORTS
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238
The Nationa
Institute o
Educatior
U.S. Department o
Educatii
Washington. D.C. 2020

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF READING
Technical Report No. 304
MORE ON THE FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF COGNITION:
A BIOFUNCTIONAL MODEL OF MENTAL CONTENT,
MENTAL STRUCTURES, AWARENESS, AND ATTENTION
Asghar Iran-Nejad and Andrew Ortony
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
December 1983
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238
The research reported herein was supported in part by the National
Institute of Education under Contract No. HEW-NIE-C-400-76-0116, and
in part by a Spencer Fellowship awarded to the second author by the
National Academy of Education.
EDITORIAL BOARD
William Nagy
Editor
R. Logan Bickford
Harry Blanchard
Nancy Bryant
Pat Chrosniak
Avon Crismore
David Dunning
Linda Fielding
Dan Foertsch
Meg Gallagher
Paul Hardin
Patricia Herman
Gabriella Herman
Asghar Iran-Nejad
Steve Levine
Margie Leys
Paul Mayberry
Mary Moes
Carol Peterman
Michael Reddix
Theresa Rogers
Judith Scott
Ileana Seda-Santana
Fernando Senior
Marcy Stein
Janice Stewart
Behrooz Tavakoli
Paul Wilson
2 The Biofunctional View
Abstract
Central to current cognitive theories is the belief that knowledge
is an organized collection of long-term structures upon which
various information processing mechanisms operate. Consequently
much research has been devoted to investigating the organizational
and processing aspects of knowledge representations. This paper
proposes a shift in the locus of theoretical analysis. Following
Bartlett, we argue that mental functioning may be more readily
characterized if the idea of abstract long-term associations and
structures is abandoned. An account of cognition is proposed in
which mental relations are transient functional relations, and in
which psychological permanence is a functional characteristic of the
neuronal system. Cognition and other aspects of mental life are
explained in terms of the activity of anatomically distributed
constellations of neuronal elements. These elements are conceived
of as physiological microsystems which are capable of generating
specialized awareness experiences. The overall mental counterpart
of the combined activity of these elements we call the schema-of-
the-moment. We hope that the model we are proposing can contribute
to bridging the gap between cognitive psychology and the
neurosciences.
More on the Functional View
of Cognition: A Biofunctional Model of
Mental Content, Mental Structures, Awareness, and Attention
This paper is the result of a substantial revision
of Iran-Nejad and Ortony (1982). The revision was
originally motivated by the desire to clarify some
of the areas in which the earlier paper was vague.
The result, however, turned out to be so different
from the original that this separate report seemed
warranted.
When psychological theories employ theoretical terms like
memory, representation, and structure, they often do so because the
descriptions and explanations of psychologically interesting
phenomena that result are at a sufficiently abstract level to be
informative and intelligible. As a first step in theory
construction the use of theoretical terms at a level of description
close to the phenomenological level is helpful, and probably
indispensable. However, the theories that result are often rather
vague and ill-constrained, and tend to lack predictive power (see,
for example, reviews of schema theory by Alba & Hasher, 1983 and
Thorndyke & Yekovitch, 1980). If this is true, then a sensible next
step would be to try to account for the phenomena of interest in
terms of more concrete constructs. In this paper we offer some
proposals for taking this step. To do this, we maintain that it is
necessary to reconsider the traditional notion of knowledge
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representations as long-term (essentially) static structures. We
shall argue that the nature of mental content, schemata, awareness,
and attention may be more readily specifiable in terms of concrete
neurophysiologically-realistic constructs if one abandons the notion
of long-term static knowledge representations in favor of transient
dynamic patterns.
An interesting aspect of attempting to employ more concrete
theoretical constructs in psychological explanations is that it
sharpens the distinction between artificial intelligence and
cognitive psychology. The two cease to be simply methodological
variants of one another. Artificial intelligence is concerned with
characterizing cognition and intelligence in abstracto; its goal is
a "system-independent" specification of the cognitive software.
Theories in cognitive psychology must be more constrained. They
need to take into account not only the constraints imposed by
people's behavior, but also the sort of constraints likely to be
imposed by the biological hardware, since it is presumably these
that give cognition its uniquely human quality. Thus, while it
might seem reasonable to start by assuming that cognition can be
explained solely in terms of the formal characteristics of
psychological software, it may well be that this assumption cannot
be upheld. Certainly, arguments have been presented to this effect.
For instance, Eliashberg (1981) examined the properties of
hypothetical machines and argued that "the popular thesis that the
problem of the algorithms performed by the brain . . . has but
little to do with the problem of brain hardware" is inadequate.
Similarly, Kugler, Kelso, and Turvey (1980) claimed that "abstract
automata formally equivalent to the turing machine do not satisfy
the natural constraints that must be met by any actual, evolved
epistemic agent. ... The cost variables imposed on organisms by
the laws of physics and biology are quite different from those
formally placed on the workings of abstract automata" (p. 5). We
share these views, believing that more attention needs to be devoted
to the functional characteristics of the physical systems that
exhibit the phenomena of interest. In fact, we believe that the
ultimate goal of cognitive psychology ought to be the specification
of the way in which the functional properties of the nervous system
make cognition possible.
There are other reasons for attempting to base an account of
cognition on relatively concrete constructs. One is that
neuroscientific models in general tend to be parsimonious. A
striking example is provided by the recent advances (e.g. Berlin &
Kay, 1969; Kay & McDaniel, 1978) in understanding the relationship
between the perception of color and the meaning of color terms in
different languages. It now seems that "all the basic color
categories of the languages of the world are based on . . . six
fundamental neural response categories, whose structures are
determined by the firing patterns of . . . cells in the visual
pathway" (Kay, 1981, p. 64). Only after taking account of the
physiology of color perception did it become possible to give a
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unified explanation of the principles governing the way in which
people in different cultures speaking different languages talk about
the world of color.
For us, the most compelling reason for using relatively
concrete constructs in psychological theories is that their use
avoids some of the problems related to the metaphorical nature of
the theoretical terms traditionally employed. Terms like memory and
knowledge-representation are complex abstractions, and it is not at
all clear to what they refer. Many psychologists (e.g. Bartlett,
1932; Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977; Jenkins, 1977;
Pylyshyn, 1973) have objected to the heavy theoretical burden
imposed upon such terms. The problem is that often the essentially
metaphorical use of these concepts can give rise to misleading
implications. For example, we ordinarily talk about mental
representations being stored in memory, searched for, and retrieved.
It is easy to see how, if taken literally, such ideas can lead to
the conclusion that people's heads are populated with a huge number
of pre-packaged permanent structures corresponding to everything
they know. We will refer to the view that postulates permanent
knowledge structures as the "structural" approach and to the
alternative view, that treats mental phenomena as resulting from
transient patterns directly created by the functioning of the
biological hardware, as the "biofunctional" approach.
Not only does the biofunctional approach differ from the
structural approach in its rejection of long-term mental structures,
but it also differs in the way it views the dynamic aspect of
cognition. The structural view deals with the dynamic aspects of
the mind in terms of searches for and changes to permanently-stored
knowledge structures. Since we question the need to postulate such
structures, we try to avoid this way of dealing with the problem: If
there are no permanent cognitive structures, then they cannot be
found or changed. In biofunctional terms, cognitive patterns are
viewed as transient dynamic structures. In short, along with
Bartlett, Bransford and his colleagues (e.g., Bransford, Nitsch &
Franks, 1977), and Dennett (1983), we argue that cognition does not
involve the selection of pre-existing cognitive structures, rather
it involves the creation and re-creation of transient ones. We wish
to emphasize, however, that our arguments against the use of
structural concepts must not be interpreted as an attempt to free
all psychological exposition from structural terms. As Freeman
(1975) points out, even at the more concrete levels of exposition
"it is reasonable and perhaps necessary to describe the
manipulations of the central state with concepts that are both
generalized and familiar from common experience . . . [although]
S. . there is not and cannot be an a priori relation between those
concepts and the dynamics of the central neural mechanisms" (p.
414). Our view is that as long as the prevailing theoretical
context clarifies the meaning of "structural" terms, their use
should cause no problems. When, on the other hand, the terminology
itself determines the underlying theoretical context, as is
sometimes the case when long-term memory metaphors are used, we
believe an inappropriate picture of the nature of mental functioning
arises.
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Over the years cognitive psychologists have gathered a great
deal of empirical data that seem to support various aspects of the
structural approach. However, there is also a great deal of
indirect evidence in the neuroscientific literature that contradicts
it (see, e.g., Freeman, 1975; Uttal, 1978). While there is
currently no direct psychological evidence supporting a
biofunctional approach (for a discussion of some indirect evidence,
see Schallert, 1982; Shanklin, 1981), the major assumption that
differentiates the structural and the biofunctional perspectives
(i.e., mental structures are transient biofunctional patterns) is
shared by many current psychobiologists and neuroscientists (see
Edelman, 1978; Freeman, 1975; John, 1967, 1972; Katchalsky, Rowland
& Blumenthal, 1974; Uttal, 1978).
Our account of cognition attempts to bridge the conceptual gap
that results from the absence of a common language between cognitive
psychology and neurophysiology. Although one might think that
compatibility of psychological theories with what is known about the
human nervous system is an obvious minimal requirement, such
compatibility is frequently conspicuously absent. For example,
Schmitt (1978) noted that "many theories of higher brain function
(learning, memory, perception, self-awareness, consciousness) have
been proposed; but in general they lack cogency with respect to
established anatomical and physiological facts and are without
biophysical and biochemical plausibility" (p. 1). Similarly,
Gallistel (1980) in discussing a psychological model of the control
of limb movement (Adams, 1977) claims that modern neurophysiological
work on the mechanisms of co-ordination renders the theory
untenable. The message is clear: psychologists need to attend more
closely to neuroscientific research.
The problem as it relates to psychological research, therefore,
does not seem to be the absence of biologically plausible theories.
Such theories exist in the work of authors like Donchin (1981),
Freeman (e.g., 1975), Grossberg (e.g., 1982), John (e.g., John,
1972; John & Schwartz, 1978), Maturana (1978), O'Keefe and Nadel
(1978, 1979), and Uttal (1978). Rather, in some subtle way, the
problem seems to relate to the deep-seatedness of the influence of
the structural paradigm on cognitive psychology. The structural
bias, we believe, has drawn attention away from existing
neuroscientific theories many of which are in essence biofunctional.
For instance, Jenkins (1981) noted that structural psychology
frequently cites William James' treatment of habit formation and
ignores his "true functionalism."
The view we are proposing is based on theoretical constructs at
three interacting levels: (a) the (neuroanatomic) micro-
organizational level, (b) the biofunctional macro-organizational
level, and (c) the psychological level. At the micro-organizational
level, we will attempt to characterize a physically unitary and
functionally autonomous microsystem as the most elementary
biofunctional unit. Consistent with the current trend in
neurophysiology, we will assume that neural microsystems correspond
to neurons, and will often refer to them as (neuronal) elements. At
the macro-organizational level, we will attempt to characterize what
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we refer to as macroactive structures. These are patterns of
activity resulting from simultaneous functioning of physically
distributed elements. Following Freeman (1975), we will refer to
the totality of active elements in the nervous system as the mass
action system. Finally, at the mental level, we will attempt to
characterize the central concept in the biofunctional model, namely
what we call the schema-of-the-moment. This is a transient mental
structure that arises from activity in the mass action system. We
use the term schema-of-the-moment for two main reasons. First, we
argue that it is in terms of this "functioning mass of the moment,"
as Bartlett (1932) and Head (1920) called it, that all cognitive
phenomena (comprehension, learning, remembering, awareness,
attention, etc.) take place. Second, the schema-of-the-moment is
assumed to be the only mental pattern in existence in a given
individual at a particular time--everything else is neuroanatomic or
neurophysiological.
The discussions in this paper are organized in three main
sections around the notion of the schema-of-the-moment. The first
discusses a number of important background questions including that
of how it might be possible for widely distributed elements to
intercommunicate. The second section discusses the pre-subjective
foundations of the schema-of-the-moment. Exactly what neuronal
microsystems are, how they function, how they generate psychological
qualities, how they are distributed, and how they functionally
relate to one another. In the third section we describe the main
characteristics and functions of the schema-of-the-moment.
The Schema-of-the-Moment: Some Preliminary Issues
The Foundations of the Structural View
There are two fundamental assumptions upon which the structural
view of cognition is based. One is that mental life can be
characterized in terms of various kinds of cognitive processes. The
other is that these processes are performed on long-term knowledge
representations. Neither of these assumptions are part of the
biofunctional view.
Most structural theories (e.g., schema theories) assume that
the dynamic aspects of cognition can be accommodated in information
processing terms. For example, the schema selection process is
assumed to be the result of some kind of search or retrieval
mechanism. The central concept employed in information processing
models to capture the dynamic (i.e., the processing) aspect is that
of an input-transformation-output sequence--the system accepts
inputs either from memory or from outside, performs transformations
on them, and produces resultant outputs, that get stored in memory
or are manifested in verbal or nonverbal behavior. The inputs and
outputs themselves are essentially static. Typically, they are
knowledge representations--data structures that exist independently
of the dynamic component. In general, information processing models
are concerned with "what happens to information about a stimulus
from the 'real world' as it passes through the system" (Klatzky,
1975, p. 11).
We believe that many of the questions addressed by information
processing theories arise only as a result of the assumption that
The Biofunctional View
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the "objects" of processing possess some independent existential
status. In the biofunctional model, the system is dynamic but it
does not process anything; there is no object of processing.
Knowledge is considered to be a transient phenomenon created and
re-created by the functioning of the biological hardware. What is
created lasts only while the underlying biological system that
creates it continues to be active. Nothing nonbiological is stored,
and apart from its potential to be re-recreated, knowledge has no
permanent existence.
An analogy based on the functioning of the endocrine glandular
system may serve to clarify the contrast between the re-creation and
input-transformation-output views. There is a group of cells
located in the cortical part of the adrenal glands. These cells,
when activated, produce the hormone, cortisol. The cells themselves
get activated by another hormone, ACTH (adrenocorticotropic
hormone), released in the anterior part of the pituitary gland. The
crucial point is that there is absolutely no input-transformation-
output relationship between the stimulator ACTH and the produced
cortisol. Adrenal cortical cells, once activated, create the
cortisol through, for example, biochemical operations based on
substances other than those contained in ACTH. It is this
dissociation between the input and the output--mediated by the
intrinsic functional properties of the specialized organismic
system--that renders any system-independent ACTH-to-cortisol
transformation rules, or any precise formal description of the
product based on them, inappropriate. The qualitative properties of
the output are determined entirely by the biofunctional properties
of the specialized cells in the adrenal glands, even though there
may sometimes be a (linear or nonlinear) quantitative relation
between the input and the output. This qualitative dissociation
between the input and the output means that, in principle, cortisol
can be produced in the total absence of ACTH, and that cortisol
might fail to be produced in the presence of ACTH. In much the same
way, neuronal mechanisms active at a given time combinefunctionally
to create a transient cognitive structure. Such a dynamic
functional organization is input-independent in the sense that there
exists a qualitative dissociation between the characteristics
inherent in the external stimulation and the functional properties
of the neuronal system. Conceptualizing the dynamic aspect of
cognition in this way eliminates the need to postulate the
preservation of long-term knowledge structures.
Ironically, Bartlett (1932), who is often cited in the context
of structural views of cognition (especially with respect to schema
theory), was strongly opposed to the idea of long-term mental
representations and favored some kind of functional account. He
made this point explicitly when he stated that his approach was
based on the "study of the conditions of organic and mental
functions, rather than ... [on] an analysis of mental structures"
and that "it was ... the latter standpoint which developed the
traditional principles of association" (p. 304). Our distinction
between structure and function is similar to that made by Bartlett.
He believed that a functional approach was necessary to explain a
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number of observations that puzzled him. For example, he found it
curious that although incoming information is learned only if it is
incorporated into what he called the "organized mass of the moment,"
later recollections of such information, in recall or in thinking,
do not always occur "en masse." What happens to the strong tie
established between the input information and the schema in terms of
which it was learned? According to Bartlett, "In remembering, we
appear to be dominated by particular past events," as opposed to
past schemata in their intact original form. He stated that what
was once an "active organized setting looks as if it has somehow
undergone a change, making it possible for parts of it which are
remote in time to have a leading role to play" (p. 202). He was
also puzzled by the fact that incoming information is learned in a
chronological sequence in which every new item is strongly
influenced by the one before it. However, later recall of an item
does not seem to favor recitation of the entire sequence and would
be highly inefficient and inappropriate if it did (see p. 219).
Thus, Bartlett concluded that thinking, for instance, is only
"possible when a way has been found of breaking up the 'massed'
influence of past stimuli and situations, only when a device has
already been discovered for conquering the sequential tyranny of
past reactions" (p. 225). This, according to Bartlett, would be
possible if schema relations were conceived of as transient (i.e.,
functional) relations.
Bartlett also favored the functional approach over the
structural approach because he found unacceptable the idea that in
an associative structure each element "retains its essential
individuality." He preferred to think of elements as combining into
an organized mass. In an organized mass, the components are not
related by association. Rather, each element loses its identity and
becomes an integrated part of the combination in the same way that,
when oxygen and hydrogen combine to produce water, the properties of
these elements are no longer evident. Furthermore, the resultant
structure comes to possess emergent properties that are not present
in any of the component elements in the same way that water
possesses properties not possessed by its component elements.
Thus, far from taking mental structures as given, Bartlett was
concerned with two complementary problems: how elements combine into
a schema, and how schema elements manage to free themselves from the
shackles of past combinations (i.e., how they "re-individualize"
themselves). While he apparently believed that this was possible
only if schema elements, when combining, entered into functional
relations, he could not decide what sort of elements would make this
possible, reluctantly picking the image as his candidate. His
reluctance seems to have been based in part on a realization that
images are overly subjective and insufficiently biological (see p.
220). Images are themselves cognitive structures, and Bartlett
apparently felt that they lacked the appropriate combinatorial
properties that the true elements in a functioning system would
require. Our solution, to be discussed later, is to specify, at the
pre-subjective neuronal level, elements that are biofunctionally
(and, only by extrapolation, psychologically) primitive.
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Mental Relations and Brain Connections
Once the notion of long-term cognitive structures is abandoned,
the question arises as to the relation between the neuroanatomic
network and the cognitive organization. In particular, it becomes
necessary to consider the extent to which, if any, there is
structural conformity between the two systems. Minsky (1980) and
Norman (1980) draw attention to the problem of specifying this
relation and refer to it as the "crossbar" and "address" problem
respectively. According to Minsky, "this problem confronts every
brain theory that tries to explain how the mind is capable of any
great range of 'associations'" (p. 124). According to Norman,
"associations among memory concepts . . [imply] much too much
knowledge of the wire (or of its biological equivalent) that is to
snake its way among the already existing stuff" (p. 22).
In theory, there are at least three types of solutions all of
which have been proposed at one time or another. The first
possibility is to postulate a particular (pre-existing or, rather,
pre-functional) neuroanatomic pattern, partial or complete,
corresponding to every cognitive pattern. This essentially amounts
to mapping the structural cognitive network into an isomorphic
neuroanatomic network. Such isomorphism was a major
psychobiological premise in Gestalt psychology (see Uttal, 1978 for
a discussion of this). Isomorphism is also implicit in the
connectionist approach to neural modeling of semantic networks,
whether these models represent concepts as particular hardware units
(Feldman, 1979, 1981; Fahlman, 1981) or as patterns of activity in
localized cell assemblies (Hinton, 1981).
The second possibility is that the neuronal network is
analogous to some sort of sophisticated telephone network. By
allowing directional hard-wired routes between elements, the nervous
system would somehow generate two-unit or multi-unit (transient)
communication patterns. A telephone network is directional because
the initiating unit must know the "address" of the target unit(s).
Directional connectionist models imply "that 'remembering' requires
the discharge of those particular cells which constitute the new
line, and those of the cells to which the line is directed" (John,
1972). John and his colleagues (e.g., John, 1967, 1972; John &
Schwartz, 1978; Thatcher & John, 1977) have been among the most
outspoken critics of connectionist models, arguing that, for
example, responses to even the most elementary stimuli (e.g., a
flash of light or a click) are made by cells distributed throughout
the brain and that a given cell participates in many functional
patterns. Although few psychologists and neuroscientists still
subscribe to the type of connectionism that John criticized,
connectionism in some form or another is still widely embraced (see,
for example, the essays in Hinton & Anderson, 1981). It is now
generally recognized that mental relations are variable. But modern
connectionists attempt to accommodate such variability in terms of
synaptic plasticity. As Uttal (1978) has convincingly argued, the
large conceptual gap between synaptic plasticity (defined in terms
of synaptic weights, facilitation levels, etc.) and complex mental
15 The Biofunctional View
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phenomena renders synaptic connectionism implausible (pp. 540-541).
Another line of argument against connectionist models comes
from recent developments in theoretical chemistry and their
application to activity in masses of neurons (Freeman, 1975;
Katchalsky et al. 1974). The thrust of the argument, which is
incidentally highly reminiscent of Bartlett's criticism of
associative connectionism cited earlier, is that neural activity,
far from occurring in terms of independent hardware units joined by
neuroanatomic connections, tends towards organization and self-
consistency in a fashion analogous to that occurring in diffusion-
coupled chemical reactions. According to Freeman (1975), these
ideas "lead to expectations of neural activity quite different from
the discrete characteristics of activity in networks" (p. 8).
Freeman claims that given this perspective, what emerges "from the
study of neural mass action is not merely an extension of current
understanding; it is revolutionary in the sense defined by Kuhn
(1970)" (p. 8).
Incidentally, it must be noted that anticonnectionists do not
reject the existence of precise neuroanatomic connections. Rather,
they maintain that although precise neural connections exist at the
anatomic level, it is necessary to distinguish between anatomical
connections and functional relations, and that a set or
constellation of neurons having fixed anatomical connections may
admit of many functional patterns (Freeman, 1975).
If synaptic plasticity or modifiability does indeed fail to
adequately explain functional connections among elements, the
nervous system must accommodate variable functional relations among
elements in some other way. The fact that neuronal elements are
capable of interacting with other distant neuronal elements that are
distributed throughout the brain suggests that there might exist
within the nervous system some sort of relational medium to make
such interaction-at-a-distance possible. The third possibility,
therefore, and the one we find most plausible, is that in addition
to synaptic modifiability, the neuronal network also communicates
through an all-spreading nondirectional relational medium. Such a
medium would allow (within amplitude, etc., constraints)
nondirectional conductance of electrical or chemical energy
(signals) in addition to directional element-to-element
interactions.
In a totally nondirectional network every signal can
potentially reach all specialized units and no signal is aimed at
any particular unit directly. Thus, the initiating unit does not
need to know the address of the target unit. Rather, target units
are specialized to get activated in response to (or "to recognize")
the functioning of the initiating unit that produces the signal, and
to remain indifferent to the functioning (and, thereby, to the
signal) of any other. Particularly relevant examples of specialized
systems functioning in a nondirectional environment are the auditory
and visual systems of animals. While both of these mechanisms
function in the same environment-filled with sound and light
waves--the ears respond to sounds but are deaf to light while the
eyes perceive light but are blind to sounds. One can imagine a
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similar principle to holds for the neural network. In other words,
it is possible that neuronal elements interact, not merely because
source elements are connected or have the addresses (or phone
numbers) of target elements, but because the elements themselves are
uniquely specialized. This specialization permits target elements
to "hear" impulse patterns that spread, like sound waves, throughout
the neural network if those patterns happen to be signals in their
"language." We believe this shift of "responsibility" from source
units to target units solves the problem of address. Thus, in this
particular sense, the act of communication is more like a (radio)
broadcast than a (phone) call because in a broadcast the source unit
emits the signal indiscriminately whereas in a phone call a decision
must be made as to who is going to receive the call and the phone
number of the target unit must be known.
The assumption of non-directional communication among neuronal
elements critically depends on the nature of localization and
distribution in the nervous system. By localization we mean that
specialized elements that are functionally highly selective are
fixed with respect to their physical location. Distribution, on the
other hand, means that the elements that are simultaneously
functioning can be physically widely spread apart. Thus, not only
does the nondirectional hypothesis solve the problem of address but
it also resolves the apparent incompatibility between localization
and distribution. Early distributed models were explicitly
nonlocalizationist. Lashley's (1950) original formulation of
distribution stated that "the same neurons which retain the memory
traces of one experience must also participate in countless other
activities" (p. 479). Somehow every neuron learned (or stored)
everything that many other neurons learned. Nonlocalized storage is
also an assumption in holographic models of distributed memory
(Pribram, 1981; Wess & Roder, 1977). However, evidence gathered by
Hubel and Wiesel (1959; 1962, 1965) and others has shown that the
brain is not a homogeneous mass. Whereas traditional models of
distributed memory considered localization and distribution to be
antithetical, more recent evidence suggests that distribution and
localization are not incompatible (e.g., Freeman, 1975; John &
Killam, 1960; John & Schwartz, 1978; Uttal, 1978). For instance,
Freeman argued that "the behavior of animals depends both on the
properties of neurons and on the ways in which they are functionally
connected or interconnected" (Freeman, 1975, p. 4, italics added).
Similarly, Uttal (1978) pointed out that while one must "emphasize
the concept of interacting systems and the premise of nonunique
localization of each psychological function . . it also appears
that there is a considerable degree of differentiation of function
of the various areas of the brain and the brain stem; that is, they
are not equipotential" (p. 354). Variable functional relations
among interacting systems can be accommodated by a system consisting
of specialized units that can communicate in terms of a
nondirectional, all-spreading environment.
We have hypothesized an all-spreading medium in order to
clarify, at least conceptually, the problem of interaction-at-a-
distance in a mass action system with distributed elements. An
19
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all-spreading environment, however, does not mean that electrical or
chemical conductance takes place in a vacuum, even though some sort
of extracellular propagation may play an important role (see
Nicholson, 1979). Neither does it mean nonspecificity or
imprecision in the pattern of actual neural connections. The neural
network as a whole may serve as a common network.
The two types of physical relational vehicles (directional and
non-directional) may be illustrated by an analogy to the functioning
of exocrine and endocrine glandular systems. Exocrine glands (e.g.,
the salivary glands) release their products into specific ducts
which direct them to target organs. These would correspond to
directional element-to-element (neuroanatomic) connections.
Endocrine glands, on the other hand, secrete their products into the
extracellular fluid surrounding capillaries. The hormones they
produce enter the blood circulation system, which is itself an all-
spreading environment. This makes it possible, for example, for the
ACTH released in the anterior pituitary gland, located on the lower
surface of the brain, to stimulate (activate) cortical adrenal cells
located above the kidneys. It is conceivable, in principle, that a
direct point-to-point duct could have been physically available to
carry ACTH from the pituitary to the adrenal glands. However, if a
tube were to be available from every endocrine gland to its target
organ, organisms would become monstrously complex. Instead, ACTH
enters the blood circulation system. This, of course, takes the
hormone to other irrelevant organs as well (hence, all-spreading and
nondirectional), but it is also sure to reach the adrenal cells
which are specialized to get activated by it, because these cells
like everything else are connected to the blood circulation network.
The possibility that the nervous system is also, in part, an
all-spreading environment analogous to the blood circulation system
cannot be ruled out. As early as the, 192 0's, Paul Weiss argued
against the connectionist view and concluded, based on the then
existing evidence, that "the central nervous system and the non-
nervous periphery entertain their mutual correspondence by means of
some sort of sending-receiving mechanism, specific for each
individual muscle." According to this view, the central nervous
system is "endowed with the capacity for discharging as many
different modes or forms of impulses as there are different muscles
in the limb." There is a specific impulse for every muscle receptor.
Every muscle receptor, on the other hand, "would possess the power
to respond selectively" to its proper impulse. Consequently, if
"the central impulses for a limb muscle were circularized in the
whole limb" the mechanism of selectivity of function "would ensure
that every call be answered by the correct muscle, even though the
latter may have been displaced, re-innervated by strange nerves, and
prevented from sending informative messages back to the centers"
(Weiss, 1936, pp. 511-512). Weiss's resonance principle is no
longer generally accepted by developmental neuroscientists, but we
believe his ideas concerning indiscriminate synaptic connectivity,
successfully challenged by Sperry and his associates (see Attardi &
Sperry, 1960, 1963; Meyer & Sperry, 1976), must be distinguished
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from his suggestive element-impulse specificity hypothesis, which
has yet to be directly tested.
An all-spreading functional environment implies that,
regardless of its place of origin in the nervous system, the signal
that a given functional pattern generates can stimulate elements
that "recognize" it wherever they may be located in the nervous
system. There are definite indications that this may be the case.
Consider a letter recognition (identification) task. Images
ordinarily begin on the retina and presumably stimulate
corresponding centers or elements somewhere in the brain. It is
conceivable that specific "image-to-center" connections as well as
long-term graphemic patterns could mediate recognition. However,
recognition need not depend on particular hard-wired connections or
on pre-existing long-term associations. Blindfolded subjects are
capable of correctly identifying letters "finger-written" on their
skin. White, Saunders, Scadden, Bach-Y-Rita, and Collins (1970)
used a visual substitution apparatus which converted optical images
into tactile displays which blind or blindfolded subjects were able
to "see with their skin." It was shown that "subjects are able to
perceive certain simple displays ... almost as soon as they have
been introduced" (p. 23) and that with minimal amounts of training
they are able "to identify familiar objects and to describe their
arrangement in depth" (p. 25).
The hypothesis of functional communication between
distinctively specialized neuronal elements also finds support in
the evidence that the re-establishment of original functional
relations is possible even after specialized cells are surgically
removed from their original site and are regrown at a different part
of the body. If a piece of skin is removed from the belly region of
a salamander and planted on its back and if, after regeneration,
this skin, now on the back, is stimulated, the animal proceeds to
scratch its belly, the original site. Such seemingly maladaptive
responses, extensively studied by Sperry and others, are often
discussed in the light of the nature/nurture issue (see, e.g., Rose,
1976). However, more basic than whether something is innate or
acquired is the problem of how it works. One may simply assume that
regeneration only connects the pre-specialized skin receptor cells
to an all-spreading neural network. There is no need for the re-
establishment of particular nerve fibers to wind their path, through
some mysterious innate guiding mechanism, all the way to the related
central cells. Once specialized receptor cells are merely connected
to the neural network (or perhaps to the particular brain region),
they can activate the individual target cells through generation of
unique energy patterns. The energy patterns, generated by the
central cells can, in turn, activate the muscles involved in the
scratching of the belly. Because the belly receptor cells function
in the same unique fashion regardless of where they are located, and
because this functioning is recognized by the related central cells
as "belly" stimulation, the animal responds maladaptively. Sperry
(e.g., 1943) explained these results "in terms of re-establishment
of specific anatomical associations rather than in terms of specific
nerve energy and resonance phenomena." But he also emphasized that
"the latter possibility is by no means excluded" (p. 47). In fact,
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it is still not clear that a resolution between Sperry's directional
connectionism and Weiss' element-impulse specificity model has yet
been achieved (see Meyer & Sperry, 1976; Sperry, 1966; Wall, 1966;
Weiss, 1966). As Wall (1966) argued, "the so-called specificity of
neuronal function . . .may mean that specificity of function can
be attained without a microscopic determination of the exact
morphological structure of some parts of the nervous system"
(p. 230).
Given the concept of an all-spreading relational vehicle, the
most efficient way of relating the cognitive system and the neuronal
system seems to be to assume that (a) the cognitive system is
comprised of transient functional relations, and that (b) that
post-functional patterns are independent of any isomorphic pre-
functional neural associations. Independence of post-functional
(mental) relations also resolves Minsky's crossbar problem. As
Minsky (1980) put it "if the mechanisms of thought can be divided
into specialists that intercommunicate only sparsely, then the
crossbar problem may need no general solution. For then, most pairs
of agents will have no real need to talk to one another; indeed,
since they speak . . .different languages, they could not even
understand each other" (p.12 5). And, to continue the metaphor, if
they can understand each other, they will do so regardless of where
they are located or whether they are connected directly so long as
they can "hear" each other (i.e., so long as they are part of the
overall neural network).
Pre-Subjective Foundations of the Schema-of-the-Moment
This section discusses some key assumptions pertaining to the
microbiofunctional and macrobiofunctional properties of the brain in
an attempt to show how these properties can explain the pre-
subjective foundations of the schema-of-the-moment. These
assumptions, while speculative in detail, are generally compatible
with existing neurophysiological literature bearing on localized and
distributed functional properties of the nervous system. For
clarity of exposition, we shall not interrupt to substantiate every
claim or to discuss the controversies that might be involved. The
interested reader is encouraged to consult Freeman (1975, Chapter 1)
on the nature of dynamic patterns, Hubel and Wiesel (1980) on
localization in the primary visual cortex, Lynch (1980) on
distribution of function in the posterior parietal cortex,
Selverston (1980) on the central pattern generators underlying
rhythmic behavior, O'Keefe and Nadel (1979) on localization of
"place-coded" neurons in the hippocampus, Puccetti and Dykes (1978)
on the problem of accounting for qualitative differences between
subjective experiences of touch, hearing, and vision, and Uttal
(1978) on the role of microscopic and macroscopic structures in the
formation of dynamic representations.
Are Pre-Existing Long-Term Patterns Necessary?
As we have said, current approaches to cognition and
comprehension presuppose the existence of long-term relatively
static knowledge representations that underlie cognitive
functioning. One motivation for hypothesizing long-term mental
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structures is the fact that ideas seem to come to mind (to be
recalled, etc.) together, or in relation to one another. It is then
assumed that they stay together in some cognitive warehouse, even
when they are not operative. Thus, the structural approach
maintains that ideas are related before they become active, and that
remembering involves activation of static knowledge representations.
By contrast, from the biofunctional perspective, there are no
pre-existing mental patterns. Cognitive relations are established
only after distributed neuronal elements become active. Like
chemical elements, neuronal elements have properties that determine
their combinatorial potentials. Only when two or more elements with
appropriate combinatorial properties (see the section on types of
combinatorial relations below) are in a state of simultaneous
functioning do they combine to generate a cognitive pattern.
Consider, as another analogy, a collection of colored lightbulbs.
When a subset of them is on, a unique pattern of light and color is
generated. It does not matter whether individual bulbs are
physically connected or when each bulb goes on. The characteristics
of the pattern are determined by the participating elements and not
by how the bulbs are connected physically or by the history of their
participation. A given pattern could result from a long sequence of
events in which some bulbs would go on and some would go off. Once
some or all of the bulbs go off, the particular pattern no longer
exists.
Similarly, a constellation of active neuronal elements
generates an idea or concept as the component elements combine into
a biofunctional pattern. This can be illustrated in terms of what
might happen when a word like dog is understood after it is heard.
Hearing the word activates a constellation of independent neuronal
elements. This happens, not because the elements are preconnected
as a neuroanatomic pattern, but because the stimulus itself (in this
case the pattern of sound waves that reach the ear) has independent
signal components that activate each of the independent elements of
a constellation--elements that can be physically distributed
throughout the brain. Once the elements are active, they combine
into a biofunctional pattern and, in doing so, they generate the
concept corresponding to the word. This notion can be clarified in
terms of another analogy. When a handful of pebbles is thrown into
a pond, each pebble hits the water at a different spot and creates a
wave pattern. Then, the wave patterns of all the pebbles combine to
form a global pattern of waves. This global pattern, which results
from the combined effects of the individual pebbles, corresponds to
the dynamic pattern created by the active elements of the
constellation underlying a concept. The concept will arise in the
psychological experience of the moment whenever the particular
elements that produce it change their activity, functioning as a
coherent combination. It does not matter how each element comes to
be active (i.e., one at a time, all at once, etc.) or what causes
them to be active (the sight of the word, the sound of the word, a
dog, etc.). In fact, according to this view, elements that create a
particular concept can come to be active as a result of the
combination of elements from two or more unrelated constellations
whose corresponding concepts have no apparent relation to one
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another. In sum, while in a structural pattern, it is the long-term
"relations among elements that counts" (Piaget, 1970, p. 9), for a
functional pattern what counts is the elements themselves-their
characteristics, how they function, and how they functionally
combine.
Neuronal Elements as Biofunctional Microsystems
The model we are proposing places a heavy theoretical burden on
the notion of neuronal elements. It is, therefore, necessary to
specify exactly what sorts of biofunctional properties these
elements should have in order to combine into macroactive structures
and in order to generate subjective experiences with sufficient
qualitative diversity.
While there is general agreement that mental structures are
complex and that they consist of more elementary components, there
is less agreement as to what these components, or elements, are.
Depending on the situation or level of analysis, theorists have used
semantic features, perceptual features, images, ideas, etc. as
primitive units of analysis. However, in an approach such as
Bartlett's or ours, where it is critical that the elements be
capable of combining while remaining, in principle,
individualizable, the choice of an appropriate standard element is
much more constrained. The biofunctional model assumes that the
most elementary theoretical construct is a physically unitary
(although not physically elemental) and functionally autonomous
microsystem. The assumption that the elements are physically
unitary systems means that they are taken to be neurophysiological
"atoms." The assumption that the elements are functionally
autonomous is compatible with their being viewed as cognitive
"atoms." In other words, we view these elements as being the most
elementary biofunctional units in the nervous system and the locus
of the link between the mind and the brain.
It is important to point out that our use of the term neuronal
element is not meant to imply that single neurons actually represent
mental structures. Traditionally, such concepts as pontifical
neurons (Fessard, 1954; Sherrington, 1947), cardinal cells (Barlow,
1969), command neurons (Wiersma & Ikeda, 1964), and feature
detectors (Hubel & Wiesel, 1980) have been postulated to represent
complex psychological patterns. In contrast to these views, we
assume that mental structures are "molecular" rather than "atomic";
more than one neuronal element must be involved in the creation of
any mental entity. In other words, individual neuronal elements do
not represent mental structures (i.e., features, images, etc.); only
distributed constellations of them do.
The claim that it is distributed constellations of neurons, and
not individual ones, that are responsible for the creation of
cognitive structures could be interpreted as meaning that individual
neuronal elements are equipotential. This is certainly not our
view. Rather, like atoms of particular simple substances, neuronal
microsystems are assumed to have unique functional properties. As
with chemical elements, these properties constrain the types of
combinations in which an element can participate, and they constrain
the conditions under which such participation can occur. However,
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within these constraints, a particular element can participate in an
indefinite number of combinations.
The biofunctional perspective also means that the neurons are
not equipotential in the sense used by nonlocalization theorists
such as Lashley. While in the biofunctional model, each neuronal
element can be considered a "memory," or rather a "potential memory"
element, it is not assumed that neurons retain memory traces; in
particular it is not necessary to assume that neurons retain memory
traces for a large number of experiences and behaviors (Lashley,
1950, p. 479). Such a claim would make the activity of neurons
completely dependent on past traces by implying that they could only
participate in combinations they already had traces for, and that
they would only respond to stimuli for which they had a matching
trace. In the biofunctional model, past experiences are re-created
because the same constellations of elements recur, not because
something is stored in each element. The system is completely
generative, creating new experiences entirely through new
combinations. At the micro-organizational level, each element is
physically located in some area of the brain. However, since the
elements can functionally coact or interact at a distance through an
all-spreading medium, the system can also be fully distributed.
At the macro-organizational level, the totality of active
neuronal elements constitutes a mass action system (Freeman 1975).
In recent years, the nature of macroactivity in the nervous system
has been the subject of an interesting new theoretical approach
derived from the field of dynamics (Freeman, 1975; Katchalsky,
Rowland & Blumenthal, 1974; Prigogine & Nicholis, 1971; Kugler,
Kelso & Turvey, 1980). According to this view, macroactive
structures are dynamic patterns that (a) consist of discrete
elements, (b) are self-organizing, and (c) consume energy to
maintain stability (see, e.g., Freeman, 1975). Katchalsky and his
colleagues, who pioneered the work in this area, state that one
possible consequence of "considering discrete systems embedded in a
continuous system would be the subordination of obvious structural
discreteness to a functional one: the spatially discrete elements
could be brought to functional continuity . . . or the structurally
continuous medium to functional (dynamic) discontinuity" (Rowland,
reported in Katchalsky, Rowland & Blumenthal 1974, p. 78). Clearly,
the biofunctional model is compatible with these views. Rewording
the Katchalsky et. al. quotation in terms of the present view: one
advantage of considering neuronal microsystems embedded in dynamic
macroactive structures that they themselves create would be the
subordination of the microsystems to their overall functional
organization. A constellation of physically unitary microsystems
could be brought to functional continuity or the continuous
macroactive organization can be subordinated to the independent
functioning of individual microsystems. It seems to us that it was
shifts of this sort in the relative subordination of individual
components to the global structure and vice versa, that Bartlett
(1932) deemed necessary in mental functioning when he argued that
not only must individual elements combine into an organized mass but
that after they do, they must once again be individualizable in the
context of the global structure.
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Microsystems as Elementary Loci of Psychological Qualities
It seems to us that the key to bridging the gap between
cognitive psychology and the neurosciences lies in the specification
of the manner in which the nervous system might generate
qualitatively diverse psychological experiences. Concern for this
problem does not seem to be a characteristic of current practice in
cognitive psychology, which tends to focus on unconscious mental
structures and processes. However, there has been some concern with
this issue in the neurosciences (see e.g., Eccles, 1953; Sperry,
1952, 1969, 1977). Recently, the problem has been brought into
sharp focus by Puccetti and Dykes (1978) who emphasized the apparent
structural (cytotechtonic) similarity of the primary visual,
auditory, and somesthetic sensory areas. Noting that these
similarities afford little opportunity for explaining differences in
subjective quality, they concluded that "not only is present-day
neuroscience unable to account for the subjective differences
[between vision, hearing, and touch] in terms of discrete neural
mechanisms, but there is no good indication that it ever will be
able to do so" (p. 337). While some of the commentators did not
find Puccetti and Dykes' conclusions very convincing, others agreed
with their assessment of the state of the art. For example,
Szentagothai (1978) went so far as to say that "the spectacular
developments in the last quarter of a century . . . have widened
. .. the gulf between the brain and the mind" (p. 367).
Our views on subjective quality are in general agreement with
those advanced over the years by Sperry (e.g., 1952, 1976, 1977),
who claimed (a) that subjective qualities emerge from the activity
of the brain, and (b) that these qualities, in turn, exert a causal
influence on brain activity. However, in searching for an
appropriate level of analysis to explain the causes of subjective
qualities, Sperry (1978) excluded the microbiofunctional level and
argued that "it is our bet that [the proper level] is not at the
atomic, molecular, cellular, or nerve-relay levels, nor even at the
sensory cortical levels, but rather at a somewhat higher level that
involves . . . centralized adjustments of the brain as a unit"
(p. 366). In this respect, we disagree with Sperry. While Sperry's
theory might account for the undifferentiated conscious experience
(i.e., global awareness), we believe it fails to explain finer
qualitative discriminations (i.e., focal awareness). By fixing the
locus of subjective quality at the level of neuronal microsystems,
the biofunctional model can not only account for people's competence
in making fine subjective discriminations (by individualizing
components of the whole), but can also explain global differences in
subjective experiences (because microsystems can combine into
macrobiofunctional organizations that involve the activity of the
entire brain).
In order to demonstrate how psychological qualities can arise
as a consequence of macroactivity in distributed constellations of
elements, we must take a closer look at the key concepts of
specialization, constellation, and combination. In order to
understand what we mean by element specialization, it may be helpful
to again use the lightbulb analogy. Let us suppose that our array
33 The Biofunctional View
36 The Biofunctional View
of lightbulbs contains two broad categories of bulbs, namely,
colored and uncolored ones. We will call the colored bulbs
"specialized elements." The uncolored bulbs we will call "raw
elements," implying that they can become specialized by getting
painted a particular color. In this array, each bulb can "perform"
a few feats always in the same unique fashion: it can go on or off,
it can become brighter or dimmer, and if it is not already
specialized it can become so. Similarly (and now we are out of the
analogy), the neuronal network can be assumed to consist of a great
number of elements, each of which is or can become specialized and
each of which can get activated or inhibited. In addition, each
specialized element can (a) change its rate of activity, (b) produce
a unique pattern of energy (i.e., a signal), (c) initiate
functioning consistently in the presence of some unique pattern of
internal or external energy (i.e., a signal), and (d) generate, when
functioning, a unique feeling of awareness. In this sense, a
specialized element is a discrete unit with quite specific but very
limited properties. This assumption is consistent with the view
that "neurons, in the course of differentiation and development and
in processing of information over the span of the organism's
lifetime, develop unique identities: genetically and experientially
determined individualities" (Schmitt, 1970, p. 208), and it is also
consistent with the evidence that the relative number of highly
specific cells seems to vary drastically with experience (Imbert &
Buisseret, 1975).
When two or more specialized elements function simultaneously
they can combine to create a macroactive organization or combination
(see the section on types of combinatorial relations below). To
emphasize the physical distribution of elements participating in a
combination, we refer to the physical counterpart of a combination
as a constellation. Constellations differ from elements in several
respects. First, unlike elements, they cannot be considered
specialized. This is because they contain autonomous elements which
can participate in other constellations. Second, elements are
assumed to be localized and physically unitary while constellations
can have elements scattered throughout the nervous system. Third,
while individual elements possess element-specific biofunctional
properties that theoretically are unambiguously traceable to some
unitary physical entity--the element itself, constellations have
nonspecific (i.e., emergent) properties which result from the
functional combination of the elements involved and which cannot be
traced to any unitary physical entity because they are different
from those possessed by any one of the participating elements.
The notion of combination encompasses four major biofunctional
aspects that result from the activity of the corresponding
constellation. First, combination is the establishment of a
transient dynamic pattern involving anatomically distributed
elements--the combinatorial aspect. Second, combination involves
the merging of element-specific energy patterns resulting in
nonspecific (i.e., emergent) energy patterns (i.e., signals)--the
relational aspect. In the case of energy, pattern combinations can
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be conceptualized in terms of interference patterns (Lashley 1950).
Third, combination involves blending of element-specific awareness
patterns into emergent awareness patterns--the qualitative aspect.
Finally, combination involves the merging of element-specific
activity into a global intensity dimension--the quantitative aspect.
Thus, not only does the biofunctional approach specify how
"potential memory" elements (i.e., the microsystems) might be
distributed but it also implies that these elements are distributed
loci of potential subjective qualities.
It appears, therefore, that the concepts of specialization,
constellation, and combination can provide a foundation in terms of
which one can account for the origination of psychological quality
within the biofunctional model. However, a fuller understanding of
this account requires an examination of three specific issues. The
first of these, discussed in the next section, pertains to the
physical locus of subjective qualities. The second, has to do with
the kinds of constraints that exist on possible combinations, and
the third is concerned with singling out the activity of components
of combinations.
Localization and Distribution of Subjective Qualities
As already mentioned, the relationship between brain hardware
and subjective qualities has received a provocative treatment in
Puccetti and Dykes (1978) and the associated commentaries. Puccetti
and Dykes started by pointing out that vision and hearing, for
instance, are qualitatively different subjective experiences. They
then assumed that if subjective qualities are localized in the
brain, one would expect to find corresponding differences in the
physical structure of those areas of the brain ordinarily associated
with vision and hearing. However, in reviewing the relevant
evidence, they could find no support for such structural
differences, and concluded that perhaps dualism was the only way out
of the dilemma. Sperry (1978), on the other hand, questioned the
validity of Puccetti and Dykes' assumption and argued that
qualitative differences need not be reflected in "activity in the
primary sensory fields of the cortex" (p. 366). Rather, they can
emerge from the activity of the brain as a whole. Like Puccetti and
Dykes, we assume that differences in psychological quality
presuppose differences at the neuronal level, even though we
disagree with their corollary assumption that qualitative
differences must be evident in the anatomic structure of various
brain areas. Rather, we assume that different brain areas differ in
biofunctional properties and not necessarily in cytostructural
characteristics. We also question Sperry's, and Puccetti and
Dykes's, claim that the causal loci of subjective qualities cannot
exist in particular areas of the brain. In fact, a major goal of
the biofunctional theory is to explain differences in subjective
quality in terms of microbiofunctional properties of brain areas.
According to this view, differences must still exist even if they
are not evident in the cytoarchitectural make up of brain tissue.
In terms of the biofunctional model, the solution to the
problem of the locus of psychological quality lies in distinguishing
between two types of localization. An important implication of
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Puccetti and Dykes' argument is that it suggests the need for just
such a distinction. Localization ordinarily refers to the physical
locus of qualitatively complex psychological phenomena (e.g.,
semantic features, concepts, the self), or to the physical locus of
mechanisms that deal with qualitatively complex input (e.g, short-
term memory, pattern analyzers, etc.). Puccetti and Dykes's
approach, on the other hand, suggests that localization occurs
according to qualitatively similar inputs (i.e., visual and
auditory) or qualitatively similar subjective experiences (e.g.,
visual imagery and auditory imagery). It is this type of
localization that is compatible with the notion of distribution
discussed earlier. Neuronal elements are localized in particular
areas of the brain according to their qualitative functional
affinities, elements with similar qualitative properties (e.g.,
those generating spatial qualities) tend to be physically close
together and those with dissimilar qualitative properties (i.e.,
spatial vs. affective elements) tend to be removed from one another.
In other words, the biofunctional theory implies that, in principle,
at the microbiofunctional (i.e., elemental) level, quality is
homogeneously localized. At the macrobiofunctional level, on the
other hand, constellating elements that generate complex and varied
conceptual categories cannot form physically localized groups. It
appears that at this level the complex nature of mental categories
and functions necessarily requires heterogeneous distribution.
A clearer illustration of localization according to
biofunctional affinities of neuronal elements can be found in the
work of O'Keefe and Nadel (1978, 1979) on localization of function
in the hippocampus. These authors have postulated that in order to
find their way around an environment, organisms make use of two
partially independent systems called the locale and the taxon
systems. The locale system, containing (qualitatively homogeneous)
"place-coded" neurons, is responsible for the generation of
absolute, nonegocentric, spatial maps. This cognitive mapping
system, they claimed, is localized in the hippocampus. The taxon
system, on the other hand, is responsible for (qualitatively
heterogeneous) taxonomic or categorical information, comprises the
rest of the brain, and consists of a number of separate subsystems.
O'Keefe and Nadel's approach may be contrasted with that of Olton,
Becker and Handelmann (1979) who have argued that the hippocampus is
the seat of the working memory. These two approaches to
localization are based on very different beliefs about the
functional properties of the brain. O'Keefe and Nadel's approach is
consistent with the biofunctional model in that it implies that
place-neurons, as a qualitatively homogeneous class, form a
localized biofunctional set.
Types of Combinatorial Relations
A system comprising a large number of partially-independent
subsystems must possess combinatorial properties so that
coactivation (or interaction) among the subsystems is possible. For
instance, it can be assumed that only a subset of elements within
each brain subsystem and throughout the entire mass action system,
constellate and reconstellate from moment to moment. Given that
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neuronal elements are specialized, and given the assumption that
they can interact at a distance, it is possible to consider
biofunctional relations among distributed elements independently of
the actual neuroanatomic connections.
To characterize the combinatorial relations (i.e. potentials)
of neuronal elements, we adopt a system of relations that was
postulated for somewhat different purposes by Festinger (1957). In
Festinger's system, three types of relations were assumed to exist
among cognitions (cognitive units): consonance, dissonance, and
irrelevance. According to Festinger, cognitions X and Y are
consonant if one follows from the other. When two cognitions have
nothing to do with each other, the relation is irrelevance. And,
finally, two elements are in a dissonant relation, "if considering
these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the
other" (p. 13).
Festinger's system of relations can be re-conceptualized as
dynamic combinatorial properties of neuronal elements, rather than
as relations among complex mental units. Recall that an important
consequence of element specialization is that neuronal elements can
generate characteristic energy (or interference) patterns that
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e., the signals)
for the activation of other elements. This means that the
functional relation between any two elements does not require that
they be connected to one another directly. Rather, in the same
fashion that square-dancers respond to the sound pattern in the air,
which is, loosely speaking, a "complementary combination" of the
sound patterns generated by the voice of the caller and that
generated by the music, the neuronal elements also "dance" to the
"sound" of the dominant interference pattern of the moment that
spreads indiscriminately through the neural network. The difference
is that in the case of the neuronal elements these microsystems are
each simultaneously a caller, a musician, and a dancer--it is a
caller/musician/dancer. Consider, for instance, three elements, A,
B, and C. Suppose that element A is specialized to generate a
unique energy pattern, E(A). Element B is specialized to get
activated in the presence of E(A); and both A and B are specialized
to coact (i.e., engage, for instance, in synchronous rhythmic
activity) in the presence of E(AB), where E(AB) is a-consonant (or
complementary) combination of E(A) and E(B). This means that
functionally E(AB) = E(A) = E(B), in much the same way as when
different instruments playing in unison are producing the same tune,
both individually and as a group. To continue the analogy, when B
gets activated it joins the band, and adopts the tune of the
moment. In this sense, there is an A-to-B consonant activity
initiation relationship and an A-B synchronous coactivation
relationship. On the other hand, specialization of elements other
than B would be such that they could not "hear" E(A) or E(AB). This
would mean an A-to-NON-B irrelevant biofunctional relationship.
Similarly, a C-to-B activation-inhibition consonant relationship
might imply a C-to-NON-B irrelevant biofunctional relation.
Now suppose that A and C are active at the same time. E(A)
will tend to activate B while E(C) will tend to inhibit it. This
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would constitute a dissonant biofunctional relation among A, B, and
C as a constellation. Such dissonance would cause a momentary state
of dissolution, by purturbing the prevailing interference pattern
(hence, tending to change its nature from signal to noise),
rendering it ineffective, and thereby breaking the dynamic
combinatorial relations among A, B, C. By analogy, dissonance is
caused by participation of individuals who can hear the music but do
not know how to call/play/dance with it. Dissonance is caused
because these participants continue to engage in activities
incompatible with the ongoing tune and so tend to disrupt the
operation, locally or globally. Resolution can be achieved if a new
interference pattern emerges to support a surviving and/or novel
constellation of elements. This can happen if expert dancers begin
to ignore the unskilled ones, if unskilled dancers drop out, if new
experts join in and act as "tune-translators" for unskilled dancers,
or if the unskilled dancers manage to make their own tune
predominant, in which case those who now cannot tune-in drop out.
Another aspect of the combinatorial potentials of neuronal
elements can be clarified in terms of the analogy to chemical
combination. So far we have assumed that neuronal elements combine
as long as they are consonant. This might seem to suggest that any
number of consonant elements, once active, would combine into a
unified whole. However, it appears more appropriate to
conceptualize consonant elements as forming complementary sets, in
the same way that oxygen and hydrogen form a complementary
combinatorial set, when they combine into water. In other words, we
assume that constellations of elements capable of simultaneous
activity in the context of particular interference patterns form
complementary or coherence sets such that in a particular instance,
if some elements are not yet active the constellation will remain
incomplete. Once all the elements come to be active, the set (and
the macroactive structure) reaches closure. According to this view,
irrelevant elements are defined by their inability to join the
active coherence set of the moment when they get activated.
Dissonant elements, on the other hand, can join in, but unlike
consonant elements, they tend to dissolve or disintegrate the active
pattern by disrupting the prevailing interference pattern. It
should be evident that irrelevance is a biofunctional relation that
is different from consonance or dissonance because it does not by
itself affect the functioning of macroactive patterns. It is
possible, therefore, to consider the quality of activity in the
nervous system as a dichotomous factor (consonance versus
dissonance) as opposed to a trichotomous one (consonance versus
dissonance versus irrelevance).
Simultaneous and Independent Functioning
The notion of consonance provides a way of conceptualizing how
constellations of neuronal elements that are physically distributed
across many brain subsystems can combine via simultaneous (rhythmic)
activity. However, if consonant activity were restricted to
simultaneous activity, the biofunctional system would not work.
Simultaneous activity tends to unify all consonant elements in the
mass action system into a global combination. As mentioned earlier,
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in biofunctional combinations, like in chemical combinations,
individual components (i.e., elements or constellations localized
within particular subsystems) tend to lose their qualitative
individualistic properties as they become part of the larger
combination. However, since the activity of the individual
components always occurs in the context of the mass action system
and never in isolation, it follows that these components should be
unable to manifest their individual qualitative properties.
Therefore, a system allowing only simultaneous activity would be
capable of manifesting only global subjective experiences but would
be unable to manifest localized (or finer) qualitative experiences.
It was perhaps for this reason that Bartlett (1932) postulated that
people must have a way of "turning round upon" their schema-of-the-
moment so as to individualize its components.
In order to deal with the problem of component
individualization in the context of the mass action system, we
believe a second type of consonant functioning must be postulated
which we refer to as component independent functioning. Independent
functioning of a component of a larger combination occurs if the
component changes its rate of activity in relation to that of the
combination as a whole. When a component does this, it manifests
its individualistic qualitative properties. In terms of the light
constellation analogy, when a constellation of lightbulbs is on, it
generates a global pattern of light. A bulb, or a subconstellation
of bulbs, can be said to function independently if it becomes
brighter or dimmer than the rest of the bulbs in the constellation.
At the time that the subconstellation is doing this, its
characteristic pattern of light (or color) becomes more evident.
It must be noted that any element or any consonant
constellation of elements in the mass action system is, in
principle, capable of functioning independently. It must also be
noted that in a system of the type proposed here (i.e., one that is
exclusively comprised of physically distributed and functionally
autonomous elements without containing all-purpose executors or
homunculi), independent functioning is the only possible mechanism
of component individualization. Thus, the present account, while
claiming that the system is homunculus-free, does not specify how
individual components come to function independently without a
homunculus. However, the biofunctional model does transform the
homunculus problem into the more concrete question of how components
of the mass action system come to function independently. Clearly,
it is conceivable, in terms of the lightbulb analogy, that in a
constellation of burning bulbs a subconstellation of them manifests
its particular characteristics by growing momentarily brighter or
dimmer, that is, by functioning independently of the rest of the
larger constellation. More difficult is the question of why this
should happen. Presumably, the bulbs do not change their brightness
spontaneously--"at will." They cannot manifest spontaneous
initiation of activity. But organismic subsystems appear to
manifest initiation of spontaneous (or "willful") activity. In
other words, organisms are somehow capable of exerting control over
organismic subsystems that comprise them (e.g., their limbs). The
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biofunctional model implies that this control does not take place
because of the control exerted by some single all-purpose homunculus
embedded somewhere in the system that is somehow capable of
controlling other qualitatively diverse subsystems. Rather,
spontaneous control is possible because of the influence of multiple
causes all of which, however, exert their influence in terms of
component independent functioning. While this way of viewing
apparently spontaneous initiation of organismic activity concretizes
the problem, our intuitions as to the cause of spontaneous
independent functioning of components add little to those of
Bartlett. Bartlett (1932) believed that the problem of component
individualization was unanswerable at the time but he insisted that
it had to somehow occur. He also maintained that whatever form a
satisfactory answer to the problem turned out to take, subjective
determination (i.e, awareness mediation) would have to be involved
(see Iran-Nejad, 1980; Iran-Nejad & Ortony, 1982). One way in which
awareness-mediated component independent functioning might work can
be illustrated by considering the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon.
Perhaps this phenomenon occurs when a person is implicitly aware of
a particular component of the mass action system but is not
sufficiently so to make it function independently and, thereby,
explicit. There are also more automatic instances of component
independent functioning. For example, independent functioning can
occur in direct response to external energy patterns, as when one
looks at a flashing light or when one encounters surprising
information.
In addition to individualization, component independent
functioning serves two other basic functions. First, it is an
awareness-enhancing mechanism. This is, of course, a restatement of
an earlier claim that when a component functions independently, it
manifests its characteristic qualitative properties. Secondly,
independent functioning is an attention mechanism; that is, an
independently functioning component becomes the center of focal
attention for the duration that it is functioning independently.
Thus, according to the functional theory, component
individualization, awareness, and attention are mediated by a single
mechanism--component independent functioning.
It is possible that the two types of consonant functioning
postulated here--independent and simultaneous--are responsible for
the two types of brain wave activity often observed in EEG records.
One type of brain wave, the synchronized slow electrical activity,
is more evident when the cortex is relatively idle. Since these
slow electrical rhythms also occur during slow-wave sleep, many
investigators have concluded that synchronizing activity is totally
passive, that slow electrical activity is only epiphenomenal to the
activity of the brain, and that no active synchronization is
involved in psychological functioning. On the other hand,
psychological activity has been assumed to occur when slow-waves are
less evident and when desynchronized activation becomes prominent
(see, e.g., Jasper, 1981). In terms of the biofunctional theory, it
may be argued that slow-wave synchronizing activation occurs as a
result of simultaneous functioning, and that desynchronized
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electrical activity occurs as a consequence of component independent
functioning.
The Schema-of-the-Moment: Principal Characteristics and Functions
We have now specified the biofunctional properties of neuronal
microsystems, how they are physically distributed, how they
intercommunicate, how they generate psychological qualities, and how
they engage in simultaneous or independent functioning. We have
characterized the neuronal system as a dynamic mass action system
consisting of a large population of specialized neuronal elements
which can combine in activity to form functional constellations. We
have proposed that specialized neuronal microsystems, as elementary
loci of subjective qualities, constitute the basis not only for
distributed (potential) memory, but also for distributed awareness
and distributed attention. Simultaneous functioning was proposed as
the mechanism for both implicit and global awareness, as well as for
broad attention. Component independent functioning, on the other
hand, was postulated as a mechanism for focal awareness and focal
attention.
With these concepts, it is now possible to present a rather
explicit account of the schema-of-the-moment, which is, loosely
speaking, the subjective counterpart of the activity in the mass
action system. In this section we shall discuss the main
characteristics of the schema-of-the-moment. In particular, we will
discuss the stability of different components of the schema-of-the-
moment and its overall continuity; we will argue that the organizing
forces of the schema-of-the-moment are content-based rather than
structure-based, and we will try to specify the nature of changes
that occur in the schema-of-the-moment in response to incoming
information. Since we believe that our concept of the schema-of-
the-moment is similar to that suggested by Bartlett (1932), much of
our discussion will involve elaborations or clarifications of his
ideas.
Stability and Continuity
The schema-of-the-moment is a constantly changing phenomenon
involving both global and focal experiences. With respect to
stability and change, the totality of the schema-of-the-moment may
be viewed as comprising three theoretically distinguishable, but not
actually separate, components. We will refer to these as the
background component of the schema-of-the-moment (Background-SOM),
the dominant component of the schema-of-the-moment (Dominant-SOM),
and the independently functioning component of the schema-of-the-
moment (Independently-Functioning-SOM). The Background-SOM is a
slowly-functioning loosely-integrated component in which elements
with consonant, dissonant, and irrelevant functional properties can
coexist. It involves the major portion of the schema-of-the-moment
and the majority of the elements in the mass action system. Because
of the slow rate of activity in the Background-SOM, it remains the
closest component to the microbiofunctional level. This is because
at low levels of activity, there is less functional integration and,
consequently, the active elements will tend to preserve their
localized individualistic functional properties. This component is
responsible for the background or peripheral awareness of such
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things as time, space, self, and various other "active" content
domains. The background-SOM is ordinarily a stable component of the
schema-of-the-moment and most of its elements maintain an activity
rhythm that can last for hours, weeks, months, or even years without
undergoing significant change. Major shifts in this component,
however, do occur especially during landmark occasions such as
unusual personal successes or failures, personal tragedies, and, to
some extent, during less dramatic changes in normal life patterns
such as travel and vacations. More subtle changes in the
Background-SOM occur as a function of interaction with other
components of the schema-of-the-moment. The Background-SOM remains
stable to the extent that its elements fail to participate, because
of their irrelevance, in other components of the schema-of-the-
moment.
The second major component, the Dominant-SOM, results from
simultaneous macroactivity in consonant elements of the moment.
This component depends for stability on its incompleteness and,
occasionally, on rehearsal. More specifically, an incomplete schema
tends to remain dominant longer than a complete one, because an
incomplete schema remains active through development while a
complete schema can remain dominant merely through effortful
rehearsal. A person is only globally aware of activity in the
Dominant-SOM and has only implicit awareness of its components.
With respect to the nature of ongoing activity, the Dominant-SOM may
be either resolving or dissolving. A resolving Dominant-SOM
consists of an incomplete set of consonant elements and tends to
remain active until closure is reached through element enrichment
(i.e., through activation of other consonant members of the
coherence set), after which time it can only remain dominant through
rehearsal. A dissolving Dominant-SOM consists of consonant and
dissonant elements and tends toward resolution through
disintegration. A dissolving Dominant-SOM may end up in total
disintegration through what might be called element shedding (i.e.,
the loss of active consonant elements). Element shedding may also
result in partial disintegration when "dissonance-infected"
consonant elements drop out until no such elements are involved, at
which time the remaining consonant elements may initiate a resolving
Dominant-SOM. Experientially, resolving Dominant-SOM activity
manifests itself as feelings of consistency, curiosity, suspense,
understanding, interestingness, and closure. Dissolving Dominant-
SOM activity, on the other hand, gives rise to experiences of
conflict, fear, anxiety, confusion, aversion, and lack of closure.
The third major component is the independently functioning
schema-of-the-moment, Independently-Functioning-SOM. This is the
most transitory component of the schema-of-the-moment, since it soon
joins either the Dominant-SOM, if it is consonant or dissonant with
it, or the Background-SOM, if it is irrelevant to the Dominant-SOM.
This tripartite characterization of the schema-of-the-moment is
not meant to suggest that the three components are actually
distinct. First, the initial creation of the Dominant-SOM occurs
when some elements in the Background-SOM come to function
independently, under the influence of external stimulation, for
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instance. Subsequently, the Background-SOM serves as the context
for the development of the Dominant-SOM and as the only source of
element enrichment for it. Subsequent Dominant-SOM enrichment is
mediated by the activity of the Independently-Functioning-SOM. It
occurs when elements in the Background-SOM consonant with those in
the Dominant-SOM come to function independently, either as a result
of changes in the external stimulation, or as a result of changes in
the internal relational environment which is, in turn, caused by the
activity in Dominant-SOM. In this way, the three components of the
schema-of-the-moment continue to interact and to create the
constantly changing phenomenal experience of the moment. So, if the
biofunctional model is correct, there are no individual mental
entities--there are no cognitive building blocks. There is total
continuity, not only with the immediate external or internal
context, but also in time, in space, and with respect to personal
history. In spite of this total continuity, it is often possible to
single out particular components of the schema-of-the-moment. But,
even when focussing on a single "distant" component, the continuity
is never lost. A quick excursion to a remote childhood experience
does not destroy the experience of the moment. It seems that it is
always the past that "visits" the present (by getting re-created
when the conditions are suitable) and not the present that searches
for the past. Transitions are almost always smooth and continuous.
The Primacy of Content over Structure
Even though we claim that there exist no long-term static
structures in the head, we still have to explain the origin of
transient structures. Our explanation here is essentially the same
as Bartlett's (1932), although Bartlett did not make his theory very
explicit. In the model we are proposing, neuronal microsystems are
the biofunctional generators of primitive psychological qualities.
At a slightly less biological level, Bartlett (1932) referred to
these primitive qualities as "images" (including what he called
percepts, appetites, instincts, ideals), and claimed that images are
the basic ingredients of the schema-of-the-moment. According to
functional models of this sort, the only type of structure that can
exist is the structure of organized content--structure cannot exist
independently of content (Shanklin, 1981). Thus, if our
interpretation of Bartlett is correct, his functional schema theory
is very different from the kinds of structural schema theories that
it has spawned. Structural theories are based on the assumption
that relatively content-free abstract structures serve to organize
content. Bartlett's theory, on the other hand, seems to suggest
that content possesses intrinsic organizing properties that
constantly produce and reproduce structure thus eliminating the need
to postulate abstract organizing structures. Furthermore, while in
his theory, Bartlett stressed that schema bias, or "determination by
schemata" as he called it, is a critical factor in cognitive
functioning, he also insisted that there is an even more potent
bias, namely, the bias inherent in the qualitative properties of
specific content elements. Element bias is more potent because, for
instance, it makes it possible to skip directly to events that
occurred in the remote past despite the determinism of the current
schema-of-the-moment:
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In the experiments on perceiving, or imaging, and on all the
various modes of recall, while there was a sense in which
subjects could accurately be said to have reacted to whatever
material was presented 'as a whole,' yet in that whole some
special features were invariably dominant. In many cases, when
the material had to be dealt with at a distance, as in
remembering, the dominant features were the first to appear,
either in image form, or descriptively through the use of
language. In fact, this is one of the great functions of
images in mental life: to pick items out of 'schemata,' and to
rid the organism of over-determination by the last preceding
member of a given series. (p. 209)
Bartlett illustrated how the reappearance of some key content
elements enabled one of his subjects to remember a story after more
than ten years. Bartlett maintained that remembering begins with a
global impression built around a few dominant details from the
original experience, an impression which is primarily of the nature
of affective quality. After the establishment of this global
impression comes the immediate return of other details that may
contain "some inventions and transformations, [but] seem clearly to
be derived from some of the events of the original story" (p. 209).
Bartlett maintained that in any learning or remembering situation,
the "dominant, or over-weighted, elements [that] stand out from the
rest ... together with their determining tendencies, are apt to set
the meaning of that situation" (p. 234). Thus, according to
Bartlett, the qualitative properties of a few content elements cause
a global impression that sets the stage for the recall of past
experiences.
Similarly, the biofunctional model assumes that at the most
primitive level content elements are created by neuronal elements.
When a subconstellation of neuronal elements representative of those
that were active at the time of the original experience get
activated (e.g., as a function of the stimuli provided by seeing and
talking to an experimenter and by the recall probes provided), it
generates element-specific awareness patterns that combine to create
the global impression. The elements also generate element-specific
energy patterns that combine to create the relational environment
that existed at the time the material was originally learned. The
relational environment then sets the stage for the activation of
other consonant elements that enrich the global impression. The
result is a schema-of-the-moment that approximates an earlier
experience.
The square-dancing analogy used earlier can illustrate how this
might happen. Recall that individual neuronal elements were likened
to individual square-dancers with the difference that neuronal
elements not only served as dancers but, at the same time, as
caller/musicians. One can imagine how a few caller/musician/dancers
might initiate a performance in a large crowd. Soon the sound of
their music pervades the air and more and more individuals join in.
Similarly, once they come to be active, a few neuronal elements that
participated in an earlier experience can re-create a relational
environment (a tune) uniquely representative of that experience.
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Acquiring New Information: Combination or Slot Filling
One of the most widely studied aspects of conventional schema
theories is the slot filling thesis. According to this, a schema is
an abstract frame that contains slots which are filled by incoming
schema-related information. A corollary of the slot filling thesis
is that people only learn what they have schemata for and ignore
everything else (Neisser, 1976). The thesis has trouble with the
fact that people can and do remember incongruous information (see,
Schallert, 1982; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).
It must be acknowledged that there have been attempts to deal
with the processing and recall of incongruous information within
conventional schema theories (see e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977 and
Schank, 1982 on expectation failures). One approach, studied
extensively by Graesser and his associates (Graesser, 1981;
Graesser, Gordon & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski & Smith,
1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981; Woll & Graesser, 1982) defines
schema-relatedness in terms of typicality--the more typical an item
of information the more likely it is to be in the schema. To the
extent that an item is schema-atypical, it is to be considered
unrelated or incongruous. In this approach, an atypical item is
recalled because at the time of learning it is indexed as such, that
is, it "is encoded with a distinctive, unique tag and stored as a
separate unit" (Woll & Graesser, 1982, p. 290).
Even if salvaged through some kind of indexing scheme, the slot
filling thesis suffers, we think, from another problem related to
the fact that it implies that new information or content fills the
slots provided by the schema passively. However, if the
biofunctional model is correct in claiming that content elements
possess their own functional properties, then these elements must
play an active combinatorial role. In fact, the claim that content
elements exert their own "active biases" was one of the recurrent
themes in Bartlett's theory. He argued that the "active biases"
caused by new incoming information play a dominant role in the
comprehension of both congruous and incongruous information.
Furthermore, Bartlett cautioned against a passive slot filling
interpretation of his theory:
The process is not merely a question of relating the newly
presented material to old acquirements of knowledge.
Primarily, it depends upon the active bias, or special reaction
tendencies, that are awakened in the observer by the new
material, and it is these tendencies which then set the new
into relation to the old. To speak as if what is accepted and
given a place in mental life is always simply a question of
what fits into already formed apperception systems is to miss
the obvious point that the process of fitting is an active
process. (p. 85)
For Bartlett, therefore, incoming information does not
passively fill slots that are made available by the operative
schema. Rather, it is the potential of the new information to
awaken qualitative "active biases" that sets "the new into relation
to the old." In other words, what is newly acquired actively
combines with what is old. The word active must be interpreted with
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caution here. It means that what is "awakened" by the new
information does not surrender itself passively to the shackles of
an active schema. Rather, the new information imposes "active
biases" of its own that often override the biases imposed by the
schema-of-the-moment, as when incongruous information spontaneously
draws attention away from the operative schema. Furthermore, if our
interpretation of Bartlett is correct, in his theory, and certainly
in the biofunctional model presented here, the potential for content
elements to play an active role exists after learning as much as it
does at the time of learning. In other words, being functionally
autonomous, these elements do not remain chained passively to a
structure after they combine with it until that structure is
reactivated, any more than dancers freeze into a "solid" frame as
soon as the tune to which they are dancing stops. Being autonomous
individuals, each dancer can participate in a different activity in
the meantime. Dynamic combination is not a long-term bond. It is
some sort of momentary cooperative activity (see Freeman, 1975), a
cooperation to create something novel.
Bartlett's observations about the nature of learning and
remembering are completely compatible with those implied by the
biofunctional model. The biofunctional model explicitly rules out
the preservation of static relations and of abstract structures.
The only option open, therefore, is to explain remembering in terms
of the functional properties of autonomous neuronal elements and not
in terms of static mental relations. In the biofunctional model,
the only relations that can be preserved are transient functional
relations--active, concrete, and particular functional relations--
where active, concrete, and particular mean on-going biological
activity in a particular organismic system. As Bartlett put it
"what is essential to the whole notion" of a schema is that it is
"actively doing something all the time ... [it is] carried along
with us, complete, though developing, from moment to moment" (1932,
p. 201).
The term transient also needs some qualification. There is a
sense in which transient functional relations could last a long
time, that is, if the activity involved continues in the manner
postulated by Bartlett and specified in this paper. A square
dancing session is inherently transient, but it could, in principle,
last for days, weeks, or even years. Therefore, if our
interpretation of Bartlett is correct, his theory was not based on
the preservation of abstract long-term relations underlying generic
information, as has been suggested by some authors (see e.g., Woll &
Graesser, 1982). On the contrary, he held that every piece of
generic or abstract information, or any other complex mental
structure, had to be re-created afresh based on the qualitative
properties of active elements. What is permanent is the elements
themselves (for Bartlett "image-like" content elements and in our
model neuronal microsystems). This is probably why Bartlett
emphasized the tendency of subjects to preserve the concrete. For
instance, he stated that:
[In folk-tales and] in other types of material, every general
opinion, every argument, every piece of reasoning, and every
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deduction, is speedily transformed and then omitted. The
greatest efforts in this direction were achieved by subjects
who reported a visual method of recall, as if this method
carries with it an inevitable bias towards the concrete. The
tendency observable in several instances for a narrative, a
description, or an argument to take on a personal form, seems
to be due in part to the same factor. . . It may, at first,
seem that the mass of folk-proverbs which are traditionally
preserved among every people contradicts the tendency toward
the concrete. But the strength of the folk-proverbs lies in
its applicability to the individual instances. As a mere
generality it never would have been preserved and, except in a
literary sense, it is practically never used. (pp. 172-173)
Bartlett maintained that acquisition of new information
involves two basic functions. First, there is an immediate
physiological function made possible by the reaction of a sensory
mechanism to external stimuli. This, he believed, is already
selective; its selectivity is determined by the qualitative
properties of the stimuli involved, and it approximates what is
generally meant by hearing, seeing, and so on. The second function
has to do with the reaction of the organism as a whole to the
immediate physiological pattern of activity. This is also selective
but its selectivity is made possible, not by some localized
mechanism, but by the global qualitative properties of the active
mass of the moment. This, Bartlett maintained, approximates what is
generally called listening as opposed to hearing, or looking as
opposed to seeing. Bartlett believed that the type of selectivity
that is directly based on "qualitative factors is dominant over any
other type in all the higher mental processes" (p., 190). This
selectivity makes it possible to gather, from among elements present
both in the active sensory pattern or in the active mass of the
moment, those elements that are "most relevant to the needs of the
moment" and so to construct an updated schema. He maintained that
construction is either spontaneous and immediate, or that it is
mediated by what he called effort after meaning, effort to relate
"what is given to something else" or to understand what is not
immediately obvious.
Bartlett's theory can be readily specified in biofunctional
terms. According to the biofunctional model, sensory stimulation
causes independent functioning of a constellation of neuronal
elements and creates a momentary Independently-Functioning-SOM which
then interacts with the Dominant-SOM in the following fashion: If
the Independently-Functioning-SOM, or a subconstellation of its
elements, is consonant with (but not necessarily typical of) the
Dominant-SOM, it will combine with it. Those elements in the
Independently-Functioning-SOM that are irrelevant to the Dominant-
SOM become part of the Background-SOM, even if they happen to be
typical of the situation in which the Dominant-SOM is active (e.g.,
the waitress serving in a restaurent has brown hair). If the
Independently-Functioning-SOM, or a subconstellation of its
elements, is dissonant with (but not necessarily atypical of) the
Dominant-SOM (e.g., long waiting lines are annoying in restaurants),
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it will cause a temporary state of dissolution in the Dominant-SOM
by causing a purturbation in the internal relational environment and
by changing the nature of the energy pattern of the moment from
signal to noise. Dissonance is resolved if the Dominant-SOM
undergoes spontaneous element enrichment or element shedding. The
diners may be relieved to see an acquaintance in the line who is fun
to talk to while waiting, or they may give up waiting and go to an
otherwise less preferred restaurant. If resolution cannot occur,
the dissonant Independently-Functioning-SOM becomes part of the
Background-SOM. The diners might decide to wait, move their
thoughts to a different topic, but, at the fringe of their
awareness, they might still remain troubled by the long wait.
Resolution or lack of it is caused by localized element bias effects
and by global schema bias effects, both of which are caused by the
functional properties of elements and both of which together
manifest themselves in terms of effort after meaning.
According to the biofunctional model, therefore, to the extent
that the Independently-Functioning-SOM combines with the Dominant-
SOM, it will lose its distinctive qualitative characteristics, just
as oxygen and hydrogen lose their combustible properties when they
combine to form water. This is how the combination hypothesis
explains the fact that in recognition memory new items can be
difficult to discriminate from similar old items. More
specifically, it is impossible to discriminate already integrated
old information from new information that differs from it only by
distinctive properties that are lost as a result of the act of
combination.
Sources of Functional Initiation
The assumption that long-term static structures do not exist,
and the complementary claim that mental relations are established
only after neuronal elements are already active, raises the problem
of how neuronal elements come to be in a state of functioning to
begin with. This problem seems particularly urgent in relation to
remembering. If mental structures are transient, how can people
remember anything? How can they recall together what they have
learned together if they have not stored it together? That these
questions appear to be so challenging seems to us to be a reflection
of the deep-seatedness of the permanent-storage metaphor, which also
seems to be responsible for widespread rejections or
misinterpretations of Bartlett's reconstructive theory of
remembering (see Iran-Nejad, 1980).
Bartlett (1932) rejected the long-term storage metaphor and
proposed that remembering is reconstructive or re-creative. In
support of his claim, he showed that recall is often inaccurate.
Some researchers (e.g., Zangwill, 1972) have treated reconstruction
as if it were equivalent to inaccuracy in recall and have considered
the fact that recall is often accurate as evidence against
Bartlett's theory. Although Spiro (1977) argued against this
interpretation of the notion of reconstruction, authors continue to
fail to distinguish between reconstruction and the mere occurrence
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of recall errors. For instance, a recent review of research on
schema theory concluded that "the consensus is that reconstruction
[i.e. as evidenced by the incidence of recall errors] is quite rare
and occurs only under special circumstances" (Alba & Hasher, 1983).
Several other researchers, on the other hand, have followed
Bartlett, as we have, in calling into question the long-term storage
metaphor and in maintaining that remembering is re-creative (see,
e.g., Bransford et al., 1977; Jenkins, 1977). However, the issue of
how accurate recall is possible given only transient functional
relations has yet to be resolved,
According to the biofunctional model, in order to demonstrate
how recall is possible without long-term storage of static
structures, the problem of remembering must be considered in terms
of two separate problems, namely, the problem of specifying the
sources of functional initiation in neuronal elements, and the
problem of specifying what happens following such functional
initiation.
The causes of initiation of (or changes in) activity in
elements can only be understood by recognizing that the nervous
system is a multiple-source dependent system with respect to
functional initiation. First, there are endogenous sources of
functional initiation that arise within the organism. Endogenous
sources may be biological, biofunctional, or mental. That hungry
individuals are more likely to seek food has perhaps more to do with
biological sources of initiation than with other endogenous sources.
While we cannot specify the relative contribution of biological
factors and their interaction with biofunctional, psychological, or
environmental sources, the fact that such factors exist is well-
established (see, e.g., Colquhoun, 1971). The major biofunctional
source of initiation of functioning, according to the present model,
might be called the combinatorial source. As elements combine, they
create novel energy (or signal) patterns that set the stage for the
initiation of functioning in other elements through the
establishment of emergent functional relations. There are also more
subtle biofunctional sources that play a critical role. A large
number of neuronal elements in the Background-SOM are specialized to
maintain a particular biofunctional rhythm or cycle. Endogenous
sources responsible for awakening organisms from sleep might be
largely of this type. The main psychological source of functional
initiation in neuronal elements is assumed to be the Dominant-SOM.
How the Dominant-SOM acts as a source of initiation of functioning,
or whether it is the only component of the schema-of-the-moment
through which the mind influences the activity of the brain, is a
question that we cannot yet answer.
The final but perhaps the most important source of functional
initiation as far as the stability and the development of the
schema-of-the-moment are concerned, are exogenous sources-those
external energy patterns (or signals) that constantly influence the
neuronal system through several independent sense organs. It seems
as though nature has found it profitable to relate organisms to the
world through more than one sense organ, each serving as an
independent source of functional initiation.
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The multiplicity of sources of functional initiation means that
after initiation of activity, the development of the schema-of-the-
moment is not a straightforward combination of functioning elements.
Rather, "the complexity of 'schematic' formation means that many
objects, many stimuli, many reactions, get organized simultaneously
into different cross-streams of organized influences" (Bartlett,
1932, p. 302). Thus, the qualitative characteristics of autonomous
elements play a vital role in the re-creation of past experiences
and in the creation of new ones. Consequently, after functional
initiation, there is a more critical phase in the development of the
schema-of-the-moment that must be taken into account. According to
the biofunctional model, the nature of activity in this phase is
solely determined by the qualitative functional properties of
neuronal elements, both at a global level (as manifested in schema
bias) and at a local level (manifested in terms of element biases).
Earlier, we used the term enrichment to refer to the development
toward closure of the Dominant-SOM. However, since multiple-source
functioning means activation of dissonant elements, activity in the
Dominant-SOM during the enrichment phase, might also be viewed as an
act of problem-solving. According to this view, post-initiation
enrichment is guided by two basic types of subjective qualities,
which are determined by dissonant and consonant biofunctional
properties of active neuronal elements and which tend to manifest
themselves in terms of what might be called problem recognition and
resolution recognition capacities. If the biofunctional theory is
correct, problem-solving during recall, and problem-solving in
general, must operate toward justification of these two types of
subjective qualities. It is this problem-solving nature of
remembering that renders recall inaccurate or accurate, as far as
"the actual facts of the learning situation," as Bartlett put it,
are concerned, since post-initiation problem-solving makes
remembering totally dependent on the Dominant-SOM at the time of
recall. Accuracy in recall is determined by the degree to which the
actual facts of the recall situation, especially those that serve as
the sources of functional initiation, approximate those of the
learning situation.
Conclusion
We have attempted to sketch a model of the mind that we hope is
compatible with what is known about the brain and the nervous
system. Our primary goal has been to address questions relevant to
psychology as opposed to artificial intelligence. We have tried to
show how cognition is possible in an animate system having the kind
of biological constraints that humans have, rather than how
cognition might be possible in some more abstract "system-
independent" manner. This choice was made because we believe that
the nature of human cognition and experience is necessarily
determined by the way in which the individual components of the
system function.
A second goal was to bridge the gap between cognitive
psychology and the neurosciences. To the extent that we have
succeeded, the result is a model that strictly speaking does not
conform to the standards of either neuroscientific models or of
psychological ones. We have drawn upon what we judged to be
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relevant literature in both the neurosciences and cognitive
psychology. Given the diversity of this literature, and given our
own particular goals, it is likely that some of the authors of the
ideas we have used will find our approach difficult to accept. In
employing the proposals of others, we have taken care to specify
clearly those aspects of their work we have found attractive. Thus,
for example, our endorsement of Sperry's proposals about
consciousness in no way entails a commitment to his general
philosophy.
There are doubtless many problems with the model we have
proposed, and perhaps with the way we have presented it. We hope
that these problems are no more serious that those facing
conventional models. On the positive side, we think that a model of
the type we have presented might be able to provide a solution to
some of the more complex philosophical problems having to do with
mental representations discussed, for example, by Dennett (1983).
Like Dennett, the central claim we have made is that it is neither
necessary nor is it ultimately fruitful to conceive of knowledge
representations as stored abstractions upon which various kinds of
cognitive processes operate.
In a paper of this kind, it is not possible to do all that one
would like. We have resisted trying to propose detailed accounts of
the huge range of aspects of mental life--each would take a book.
We have also not discussed the empirical consequences of the view we
have proposed because that would have necessitated just such
detailed discussions of the individual aspects of cognition. We
have preferred to present an impressionistic sketch of our account
from which, hopefully, the big picture emerges even if some of the
details are absent or do not accurately portray the way things
really are.
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There is a striking parallel between the approach taken I
Roman physiologist Galen (c.AD 130-201) and current information
processing psychology--information processing psychology is bas
the same type of industrial plant metaphor that haunted Galenia
physiology (see Miller, 1978). Galen was concerned with how
inanimate matter, as the input to the body via foodstuff, is
transformed to animate matter. Internal organs (e.g., the hear
the liver, the lungs) were considered relevant to the extent th
they helped carry out such transformations. In Galen's physiol
as in information processing psychology, "the most notable feati
of the system is the emphasis on manufacture and transformation
S processes which convert . . . substances" (Miller, 1978,
p. 187).
)0-
:ond
)y the
ed on
n
t,
at
ogy,
ure
81 The Biofunctional View



